SERIES: GETTING INTO THEIR MINDS  

Part I: The Arab Mind  

Review of Raphael Patai’s, The Arab Mind; Hatherleigh Press; ISBN: 1-57826-117-1; Revised Edition, 2002.

As I dug ever deeper into Islam after the events of 11 September 2001, I realized that my understanding of Islam needed something to supplement it, to make it more complete. Of course, I had needed to understand Islam itself.  For this, I turned, among other places, to the books of Robert Spencer (Islam Unveiled and Onward Muslim Soldiers), Ibn Warraq (Why I Am Not a Muslim), and others. As valuable as these were, and they were, and are, magnificent, I needed something else, something qualitatively different.  

After I read Raphael Patai's, The Arab Mind, I knew that I had found an exceptionally important explanation of the other component of the Islam problem: the Arab mind itself. In Dr. Patai, I had found an explanation of how Islam works on the Arab mind to produce its characteristic persona. In fact, I had found a key to being able to develop an explanation of how Islam takes normal human beings and turns them into killer robots (kill-bots) set relentlessly onto jihad. I regard this book as one of the most important books I have found about Islam and Arabs.  

It is not a new book. Written in the 1970s, it was last revised by Dr. Patai in 1983. Until recently, it lay out of print. Just as it found new life for Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield in 1991, it finds new life for our war on Islamic terrorism since 2001. A few demographic statistics might be dated, but the heart, the brain, and the very flesh of this book are as fresh as if it had been published yesterday afternoon.          

Dr. Patai became interested in the Middle East and its inhabitants in his native Hungary in pre-adolescence. He continued these studies in Germany and Hungary through the university level. He became, among other accomplishments, a scholar of the Arabic language. In 1933, he traveled to Jerusalem for further studies. He steeped himself in the living language, society, and culture of the Middle East and Arabs. After World War II, he returned to the area now known as Israel. In the ensuing years, he devoted his attention to learning all he could about conceptualizing how Arabs think, feel, and act.  

Throughout his life, he said "When it comes to the Arabs, I must admit to an incurable romanticism; nay, more than that, to having had a life-long attachment to Araby." He poured his loving scholarship into this one-of-a-kind volume, one of the very few books available today on the subject of how Arabs use their minds, and perhaps the very best. Although loving the people, he remained objective about them and their culture. Dr. Patai died in 1996.  

In my experience, forewords to books add too little that is worthy of comment. The forward to The Arab Mind is an exception. In November 2001, Army Colonel Norvell B. De Atkine wrote an unusually useful, post-11 September 2001 commentary to the present edition. He corroborates the contents and presentation of The Arab Mind from the perspective of his own special interest and study in the same field, and his twenty-five years of living in the Middle East. Using his own knowledge and experience along with this book, he taught many U. S. military leaders and soldiers how to view the inhabitants of the Middle East correctly. Like Dr. Patai, he does not engage in political correctness and cultural and moral relativism. As does Dr. Patai, he stresses the central power of the Arabic language in the shaping of Arabic behavior. Soldiers returning from the Middle East report that what they found exactly matched what Dr. Patai had written about. Without this book, our military personnel across many years would have been lost trying to understand the Arab mentality.  

The Arab Mind is almost 500 pages in length, but the meat of the text is only some 333 pages. The rest is comprised of notes, a postscript on the development during the ten years following initial publication of the book, extensive tables, and two appendices. It is worth citing the titles of the chapters as a handy way to get a snapshot grasp of the scope of the book:  

1. The Arabs and the World

2. The Group Aspects of the Mind

3. Arab Child-Rearing Practices

4. Under the Spell of Language

5. The Bedouin Substratum of the Arab Personality

6. Bedouin Values

7. The Bedouin Ethos and Modern Arab Society

8. The Realm of Sex

9. The Islamic Component of the Arab Personality

10. Extremes and Emotions, Fantasy and Reality

11. Art, Music, and Literature

12. Bilingualism, Marginality, and Ambivalence

13. Unity and Conflict

14. Conflict Resolution and "Conferentiasis"

15. The Question of Arab Stagnation

16. The Psychology of Westernization

Conclusion  

Dr. Patai wrote before the disease of "political correctness," spawned in the philosophical sewers of the 1960s and 1970s, had taken hold. Nowadays, he would be accused of racial stereotyping by writing about the Arab personality. However, he defined his subject and the boundaries of his examination. He asked, "What can be common to a group is a specific feature, or a set of specific features, that social psychologists and anthropologists have reference to when they talk about national character or modal personality?" He adds, "The basis of modal personality or national character studies is the observation that human beings who grow up in a common environment exhibit, beyond their individual differences, a strong common factor in their personality."

It is this modal personality or national character that he addresses. "I would, therefore, venture to define national character as the sum total of the motives, traits, beliefs, and values shared by the plurality in a national population" (his emphasis). That is why and how he can identify, study, and conceptualize the Arab mind, and he is as correct today as he ever was, regardless of the tenor of our times. This is the basis for our recognizing and separating peoples as belonging to nationalities, races, genders, and so on, based on common characteristics, and none of this involves the devaluation of any member because of it. The context of who is an Arab is very simple: "Persons whose mother tongue is Arabic may be brought up in a non-Arab culture (e.g., in French culture in North Africa), and still consider themselves Arabs and be so considered by others." Identity comes from language for these people. Islam and the Arabic language are seamlessly fused: Islam shaped Arabic; Arabic shapes Islam; and both shape Arabs.  

This book is so rich with material that it cannot be contained in any review. Only a few of its many treasures can be alluded to. It is extremely well-written and merits study. For this review, I will focus on some of the key elements of the book which opened my mind to the nature of the Arab.

 Arabs put exceptionally high value on their language, and they are exceptionally influenced by it. Dr. Patai likens Arabic to music because of how extensively is the language linked to the emotions of Arabs. Arabs tend to be wordy, or, as Dr. Patai says, they engage extensively in "rhetoricism." Linked seamlessly to rhetoricism is their proneness to verbal exaggeration and overemphasis. If we wish someone a "speedy recovery," the Arab will tend to say "May there be upon you nothing but health, if Allah wills." Our mutually exchanged "Good Morning" becomes something like "May your day be prosperous," and you likely will receive in response, "May your day be prosperous and blessed." During the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Iraqi Prime Minister proclaimed to the Arab joint chiefs that all they needed were a few brooms to drive the Jews into the sea. We know, however, what really happened.  

Dr. Patai explains this exaggeration as the mental phenomenon "... [I]n which the desired event is represented as an accomplished fact." This is pure primacy of consciousness epistemology which says something is so because I want it. Baghdad Bob was a shamelessly typical user of Arab exaggeration and overemphasis [in essence, "Pay no attention to those American tanks behind me. There are no Americans in Baghdad, and we have vanquished the infidels totally."]. He sounded comical to us, but Baghdad Bob was deadly serious. If we do not learn how Arabs think, we can never deal with them effectively.

 Another predilection is for repetition. Listen to Arabs fluent in English and note how they cover the same material over and over in most of their statements. Furthermore, words do not have the same meaning as concepts to the Arab. Dr. Patai cites how our American economy of expression "...may sound weak and even doubtful to the Arabs who read it." In America, we joke when a hardhead wont take no for an answer by asking, "What part of 'no' don't you understand?" An Arab requires increasingly elaborate overstatement and repetition, with embellishment, before he accepts "No." "Yes" and "no" have indefinite meanings to Arabs.

          Another characteristic of Arabs is how they substitute words for actions. Dr. Patai quotes an Egyptian official's response to a Time Magazine interview in 1971:  

"When Arabs argue, they start on opposite sidewalks and shout at one another, 'I will carve you into pieces!' and 'You'll never live to see another sunset!' Then, after ten or 15 minutes, they walk away and nobody gets hurt."  

The Arab does not intend to carry out his threats, demands, or even his intentions. Expressing them serves to relieve emotional tension, and by uttering them, it is as though these acts had been actually carried out. Intentions, or going only to the first step toward doing something, "... serve as a substitute for achievement and accomplishment." Arabs characteristically substitute words for actions. This is one of the reasons they get so little done.  

Another Arab characteristic which is part of Arabic language is the lack of a sense of time. Dr. Patai explains the linguistic reasons for this and points out why the historical timing in the Koran is so "off." “... [T]o the mind of Muhammad, the Exodus of the Children of Israel from Egypt (thirteenth century B.C.) and the foundation of Christianity were practically simultaneous events." On a more mundane level, "being on time" does not mean the same to Arabs as it does to us. For example, two delegations from two Arab countries joined a pan-Arab meeting for the first time on the day of adjournment. They were not considered late.  

Arabic as a language arose in Syria just slightly ahead of the formation of Islam, and it was truly in its infancy during the time of Muhammad. It grew up with Islam, and it became the official language for all Muslim conquered peoples. You can see that Islam and Arabic fused seamlessly, and they have reinforced each other.  

Arabs were mostly Bedouins, and Bedouin culture became integral to Arabic and Islam. One of its characteristics is hyper-emotionality, including emotional intensity. Little has changed among the Bedouins to this day. "Groupism" is everything, as are certain personality traits such as bravery-cowardice (honor-shame, humiliation), aggressiveness-peacefulness, or manliness-meekness, and the need for blood revenge. See if this sounds familiar these days: "The Bedouin temper is characterized by sudden flare-ups, which can easily lead to violence and even murder, followed by remorse and long periods of tranquility, inactivity, almost apathy." In our culture, this style of tension build-up and release through action occurs frequently among wife and child abusers and serial killers, among other sub-populations.  

Dr. Patai devotes a chapter to the Islamic component of the Arab personality. He stresses the fusion of Islam with each Muslim Arabs mind and each’s literal acceptance of Islam without question. This relationship makes Islam a potent shaper of the personality and life of each Muslim Arab.

He adds other Islamic influences usually not sufficiently emphasized in many works. The first is "predestination," which is as old as the Koran itself, he states. "Whatever man is or does and whatever happens to him is directly willed by Allah." Christianity and Judaism held the same belief way back then, but it was mitigated through reformations. Islam retained determinism, and it has had a profound impact on the Arab personality. "All references to the future, to what one plans to do or hopes will happen, contain the expression In shaa Ilah ("If God wills")." Think of what the pervasive belief in determinism does to anyone. Says Dr. Patai, "The smallest everyday event or activity is believed to be determined by His [Allah’s] personal decision." Another name for this is "fatalism." Allah provides, they say over and over so, why work? After all, nothing whatsoever is in your control (even whether you attain Paradise), and it doesn’t matter whether you want something, love something, or want to better yourself. Inshallah!  

Add to this, improvidence. "For the tradition-bound Arab mind, there is even something sinful in engaging in long-range planning, because it seems to imply that one does not put ones trust in divine providence." Such a belief has been central to centuries of impoverishment.

Any deterministic belief "... inclines the Arab to abdicate responsibility for improving his lot or providing for his future." The Arab blames his foibles and that of his society on fate or the devil, or to imperialism. When castigated for passivity or corruption, he shrugs and claims that he is forced by uncontrollable forces to be and do as he does. This is one of the biggest reasons why self-responsibility is so lacking.

          Dr. Patai closes this chapter with an eloquent paragraph:

"The fact remains that under traditional Islam, efforts at human improvement have rarely transcended ineffectuality. In general the Arab mind, dominated by Islam, has been bent more on preserving than innovating, on maintaining than improving, on continuing than initiating. In this atmosphere, whatever individual spirit of research and inquiry existed in the great age of medieval Arab culture became gradually stifled; by the fifteenth century, Arab intellectual curiosity was fast asleep. It was to remain inert until awakened four centuries later by an importunate West knocking on its doors."  

This is the mechanism by which Islam stifles and squanders human minds. Few seem to know that Islamists formally banned reason and philosophy by about 900 A.D. and forbade its citizens to think outside the Islamic box.  

The last section of this outstanding book that I want to cover is its final chapter, called "The Psychology of Westernization." I want to reemphasize that I have had to select mere tidbits from a vast banquet presented in this book. Anything I have left out must not be presumed to be unimportant: No one wants to read a fifty-page review. This book is worth being kept as a valuable reference for your library, to be read again and again, and never allowed to go out of print.  

We have two major populations today in America regarding the Middle East. One is composed of those who will not identify the Middle East, Islam, and Arabs for what they are for a host of reasons, none of which are good. The other is a much larger population of people who are simply lazily ignorant about these three areas, even after 11 September 2001. These people make too little effort to erase their ignorance, even though so much good material is available these days at such affordable costs. Both populations subvert our efforts to defend America, which begins with identifying these agents provocateurs coming from Islamia. The first population cited wring their hands that we, America, have caused Islamists to hate us; it is all our fault. The second population are perplexed about why these fanatics are trying to annihilate us. Why do they hate the West and America?  

I find Dr. Patai, in answering this, to be right on target with the basic facts and principles. However, he simply did not grasp the intensity of jihad as we are experiencing it, although he clearly defines many of the elements which are responsible for it. During the decade of the 1970s and early 1980s, when the period this book was published and revised, jihad had not yet reached the intensity and action focus that it has today. We must fill in where Dr. Patai left off. 

He approaches the problem in this final chapter, which deals with how the Middle East and Arabs have related to the West. Colonialism passed, and nationalism failed to take hold fully. “... [I]n most parts of the Arab world, decrease in political dependence on the West came to be accompanied by an increase in Western cultural influences." They interpreted this influx of culture from the West as increasing their cultural subservience to the West. Demonizing Israel worked in their cultures, so they began demonizing the West as well.  

But the Arab mind, stuffed with its characteristic contents and processes, has never been able to adapt to the process of modernization represented by the West. "It has often been observed that the Arabs are willing and even eager to accept whatever the West offers them in the way of machinery and gadgetry. The problem arises in connection with the production aspects of technology. The foundations on which technology rests remain unexplored, and the making of machines and gadgets, as distinct from their use, remains alien." “ ... The traditional Arab disdain for manual labor constantly militates against such a course [of developing them]."

         How a mind works depends on the ideas that feed it. Note how Saudi Arabia still depends on Westerners to get its oil out of its own ground and exported. By now, Saudis should have been able to manage all aspects of their own oil production. But, you are only as good as the ideas you hold. Arab societies are not called "the immovable East" for nothing.  

Another such anti-Western element worth mentioning here is the Arab inclination to personalize problems. A Swiss Arabist remarks that this mental process causes Arab countries to harbor the view that the technical difficulties of learning and adopting elements of Western civilization, instead of being part of learning curves, result from human malevolence. As such, the "difficulties" constitute a humiliation [part of the honor-shame responses utterly controlling Arab minds]. How often have we heard this response? Even a defeat in elections results in such humiliation for the loser that he often takes up arms against the victor and the government, while allying himself with those who promise victory next time. "The intrusion of impersonal, objective factors into his world makes the Arab feel impotent in overcoming defeat, and diminishes his gratification from a success which now appears as not having been the result of his ability to overcome personal antagonists."  

As we know, the Arab-Islamists look at their pitiful lot, and then project their guilt and hostility onto us. They blame us for everything, which absolves them of any responsibility and thus any ability to change. They feel that the very existence of the culture of Western civilization threatens Islam itself; it shakes these totally insecure people into fearing metaphysical oblivion. Their hatred for us is in direct proportion to their fear.  

Three elements come together to give Americans a deep understanding of the entire problem of Islam, in every respect. The factual works of Ibn Warraq, Robert Spencer, Craig Winn, and others make up the first arm. The second arm comes from philosophy; adequate understanding of Islamic philosophy provides the ability to think about the problem of Islam in terms of principles. The third arm comes from this book by Raphael Patai. It shows how the history, facts, and philosophy produce the Arab psychology; it is the Arab mind in the Arab body killing people through jihad. 

If we follow all the arms, we will preserve our lives and our civilization. Once we know the Arab-Islamic mind, we can construct an effective remedy.