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Delusions of Honesty
Tony Blair’s domestic legacy: corruption and the
erosion of liberty
Theodore Dalrymple
Summer 2007
When Tony Blair announced his resignation after
ten years as prime minister of the United Kingdom, his
voice choked with emotion and he nearly shed a tear. He
asked his audience to believe that he had always done
what he thought was right. He would have been nearer the
mark had he said that he always thought that what was
right was whatever he had done. Throughout his years in
office, he kept inviolable his belief in the existence
of a purely beneficent essence of himself, a belief so
strong that no quantity of untruthfulness, shady
dealings, unscrupulousness, or constitutional
impropriety could undermine or destroy it. Having come
into the world marked by Original Virtue, Blair was also
a natural-born preacher.
In a confessional mood,
Blair admitted that he had sometimes fallen short of
what was expected of him. He did not give specifics, but
we were expected to admire his candor and humility in
making such an admission. It is no coincidence, however,
that Blair reached maturity at the time of the
publication of the famous book Psychobabble,
which dissects the modern tendency to indulge in
self-obsession without self-examination. Here was a
mea culpa without the culpa. Bless me, people
(Blair appeared to be saying), for I have sinned: but
please don’t ask me to say how.
There undoubtedly were
things to be grateful for during the Blair years. His
support for American policy in Iraq won him much
sympathy in the U.S., of course. He was often eloquent
in defense of liberty. And under Blair’s leadership,
Britain enjoyed ten years of uninterrupted economic
growth, leaving large parts of the country prosperous as
never before. London became one of the world’s richest
cities, vying with New York to be the global economy’s
financial center. Blair did inherit a strapping economy
from his predecessor, and he left its management more or
less to the man who succeeds him, Gordon Brown. Still,
unlike previous Labour prime ministers, he did not
preside over an economic crisis: in itself, something to
be proud of.
But how history will
judge him overall, and whether it will absolve him (to
adapt slightly a phrase coined by a famous, though now
ailing, Antillean dictator), is another matter. Strictly
speaking, history doesn’t absolve, or for that matter
vindicate, anybody; only people absolve or vindicate,
and except in the most obvious cases of villainy or
sainthood, they come to different conclusions, using
basically the same evidence. There can thus be no
definitive judgment of Blair, especially one
contemporaneous with his departure. Still, I will try.
Blair’s resignation announcement was typical of
the man and, one must admit, of the new culture from
which he emerged: lachrymose and self-serving. It
revealed an unfailing eye and ear for the ersatz and the
kitsch, which allowed him so long to play upon the
sensibilities of a large section of the population as
upon a pipe.
He knew exactly what to
say of Princess Diana when she died in a car accident,
for example: that she was “the people’s princess.” He
sensed acutely that the times were not so much
democratic as demotic: that economic egalitarianism
having suffered a decisive defeat both in theory and
practice, the only mass appeal left to a politician
calling himself radical was to cultural egalitarianism.
He could gauge the feelings of the people because, in
large part, he shared them. A devotee himself of the
cult of celebrity, in which the marriage of glamour and
banality both reassures democratic sentiment and
stimulates fantasies of luxury, he sought the company of
minor show-business personalities and stayed in their
homes during his holidays. The practical demonstration
that he worshiped at the same shrines as the people did,
that his tastes were the same as theirs, more than
compensated for the faint odor of impropriety that this
gave off. And differences of taste, after all, unite or
divide men more profoundly than anything else.
No prime minister had
ever been at once so ubiquitous and so inaccessible.
Instinctively understanding the dynamics of the cult of
celebrity, Blair was both familiar (he insisted on being
known by a diminutive) and distant (he acted more as
head of state than as head of government, and spent
three times more on his own office than did his
predecessor). Having invited 60 ordinary citizens into
Downing Street so that they could give him their views,
and so that he could say that he listened to the people,
he proceeded to address them via a huge plasma screen,
though he was in the building. So near, and yet so far:
this was a grand vizier’s durbar for the age of virtual
reality. With Blair, communication, like time’s arrow,
flew in one direction only.
Tony Blair was the
perfect politician for an age of short attention spans.
What he said on one day had no necessary connection with
what he said on the following day: and if someone
pointed out the contradiction, he would use his favorite
phrase, “It’s time to move on,” as if detecting
contradictions in what he said were some kind of curious
psychological symptom in the person detecting them.
Many have surmised that
there was an essential flaw in Blair’s makeup that
turned him gradually from the most popular to the most
unpopular prime minister of recent history. The problem
is to name that essential flaw. As a psychiatrist, I
found this problem peculiarly irritating (bearing in
mind that it is always highly speculative to make a
diagnosis at a distance). But finally, a possible
solution arrived in a flash of illumination. Blair
suffered from a condition previously unknown to me:
delusions of honesty.
Blair came to power promising that his government
would be “purer than pure,” an expression both
self-righteous and somewhat foolish, given the fallen
nature of man. The Tories preceding him in government
had become notorious for acts of corruption that now
appear trifling. Indeed, one objection to those acts—for
example, asking questions in the House of Commons in
return for payment, handed under the table in used
banknotes wrapped in brown paper envelopes—was the
derisory sums involved. What kind of person would risk
ruin for amounts of money that honest people could make
in a week or two?
Soon after Blair took
office, however, a billionaire named Bernie Ecclestone
offered the Labour Party a $2 million donation if the
government exempted Formula 1 motor racing, which he
controlled, from the ban on cigarette ads at sporting
events. The government granted the exemption. After
public exposure, Blair declared himself to be such a
“straight kind of guy” that it was inconceivable that he
had involved himself in such an unsavory
arrangement—though clearly he had. It was his capacity
to believe his own untruths that proved so persuasive to
others; it was among his greatest political assets.
Such scandals—involving
favors granted to rich men, followed, after exposure, by
protestations of injured innocence—punctuated Blair’s
tenure with monotonous regularity. One of the more
notorious was the letter that Blair sent to the Romanian
prime minister, Adrian Nastase, encouraging him to sell
the state-owned steel producer Sidex to billionaire
industrialist Lakshmi Mittal; it would help Romania’s
application to join the European Union, Blair argued, if
a British company bought the steel producer. But
Mittal’s company was not British; of its 125,000
employees, only 100 worked in Britain; indeed, Mittal
himself was not British. He had, however, donated
$250,000 to Labour shortly beforehand.
Far from being purer than pure, Blair was laxly
forgiving of impropriety in others, provided that they
were loyal or politically useful to him. The case of
Peter Mandelson is particularly instructive. When first
a minister, Mandelson borrowed a large sum of money from
another minister, Geoffrey Robinson, a multimillionaire,
in order to buy a house. Not only did Mandelson fail to
tell the bank that lent him the rest of the money for
the purchase that the money he had in hand was not his
own (in less well-connected mortals, that would be
considered fraud); the government department that
Mandelson headed at the time was investigating
Robinson’s own business affairs for suspected
improprieties.
Public exposure forced
Blair to accept Mandelson’s resignation. But the prime
minister soon reappointed Mandelson to the cabinet.
Blair accepted Mandelson’s resignation a second time,
however, when it emerged that he had pushed through the
passport application of one of the Hinduja brothers,
Indian businessmen accused of corruption in India, after
a $2 million donation to Labour. Blair then rewarded
Mandelson with the lucrative and powerful post of
European Commissioner. What is one to conclude from
this?
Having come into power
deeply critical of the previous government’s use of
private consultants, Blair promptly increased spending
on them at least tenfold, ensuring the loyalty of senior
civil servants (traditionally a professional cadre, not
political appointees) by allowing them to cross back and
forth between public and private employment, enriching
themselves enormously at public expense in the process.
Thus Blair played Mephistopheles to the civil service’s
Faust, introducing levels of corruption and patronage
not seen in Britain since the eighteenth century. Huge
sums of money have disappeared, as if into a black hole,
into such organizations as the National Health Service,
where bureaucracies have hugely expanded and entwined
their interests so closely with those of private
suppliers and consultancies that it is difficult to
distinguish public from private any longer. Spending on
the NHS has increased by two and a half times in the
space of ten years; yet it is hard to see any
corresponding improvement in the service, other than in
the standard of living of those who work in it.
Blair even became the
first serving prime minister in history to find himself
questioned by the police in Downing Street, under
caution of self-incrimination, in the course of a
criminal investigation—in this case, into the selling of
seats in the House of Lords. Small wonder that for much
of the population, truth and Blair now appear to inhabit
parallel universes. Reflecting the country’s mood is the
famous remark that Gordon Brown made to Blair: “There is
nothing that you could say to me now that I could ever
believe.”
Blair proved unusually expert in the
postmodernist art of spin. A political advisor to the
government perfectly captured this approach on September
11, 2001, when she said that it was “a good day to bury
bad news.” In other words, you can get away with
anything if the timing is right.
At the outset of his
tenure, Blair said that his government would be tough on
crime and on the causes of crime. He wanted to
appeal—and succeeded in appealing—to two constituencies
at once: those who wanted criminals locked up, and those
who saw crime as the natural consequence of social
injustice, a kind of inchoate protest against the
conditions in which they lived.
Blair’s resultant task
was to obfuscate, so that the electorate and even
experts could not find out, without great difficulty,
what was going on. For example, Blair’s government,
aware of public unrest about the number of criminals
leaving prison only to commit further serious crimes,
introduced indeterminate sentencing—open-ended
imprisonment—apparently a tough response to repeat
offenders. But the reality was different: the sentencing
judges still had the discretion to determine such
criminals’ parole dates, which, in England, are de facto
release dates. The sentences that criminals would serve,
in other words, would be no longer than before the new
law.
Another way to confuse
the public was to corrupt official statistics. Last
year, to take one example, the government dropped three
simple but key measures from the compendious statistics
that it gathers about people serving community
sentences—that is, various kinds of service and
supervision outside prison: their criminal histories
prior to sentencing, their reconviction rates, and the
number given prison sentences while serving their
community sentences. Instead, it introduced an utterly
meaningless measure, at least from a public-safety
perspective: the proportion of people with community
sentences who abide by such conditions as weekly
attendance for an hour at a probation office.
The police also received
encouragement to keep crime numbers down by not
recording crimes. The crime rate has fallen in part
because shoplifting has ceased to be a crime, for
instance. Police now deal with it the way they do with
parking violations: shoplifters get on-the-spot fines
worth half, on average, of the value of the goods that
they have stolen.
The problem of unemployment in Britain
illustrates perfectly the methods that Blair’s
government used to obscure the truth. The world
generally believes that, thanks to Labour’s prudent
policies, Britain now enjoys low unemployment; indeed,
Blair has often lectured other leaders on the subject.
The low rate is not strictly a lie: those counted
officially as unemployed are today relatively few.
Unfortunately, those
counted as sick are many; and if you add the numbers of
unemployed and sick together, the figure remains
remarkably constant in recent years, oscillating around
3.5 million, though the proportion of sick to unemployed
has risen rapidly. Approximately 2.7 million people are
receiving disability benefits in Britain, 8 or 9 percent
of the workforce, highly concentrated in the areas of
former unemployment; more people are claiming that
psychiatric disorders prevent them from working than are
claiming that work is unavailable. In the former
coal-mining town of Merthyr Tydfil, about a quarter of
the adult population is on disability. Britain is thus
the ill man of Europe, though all objective indicators
suggest that people are living longer and healthier
lives than ever.
Three groups profit from
this statistical legerdemain: first, the unemployed
themselves, because disability benefits are about 60
percent higher than unemployment benefits, and, once one
is receiving them, one does not have to pretend to be
looking for work; second, the doctors who make the bogus
diagnoses, because by doing so they remove a possible
cause of conflict with their patients and, given the
assault rate on British doctors, this is important to
them; and finally, the government, which can claim to
have reduced unemployment.
But such obfuscation is
destructive of human personality. The unemployed have to
pretend something untrue—namely, that they are sick; the
medical profession winds up humiliated and dispirited by
taking part in fraud; and the government avoids, for a
time, real economic problems. Thus the whole of society
finds itself corrupted and infantilized by its inability
to talk straight; and that Blair could speak with
conviction of the low unemployment rate, and believe
that he was telling the truth, is to me worse than if he
had been a dastardly cynic.
Tony Blair’s most alarming characteristic,
however, has been his enmity to freedom in his own
country, whatever his feelings about it in other
countries. No British prime minister in 200 years has
done more to curtail civil liberties than has Blair.
Starting with an assumption of his infinite beneficence,
he assumed infinite responsibility, with the result that
Britain has become a country with a degree of official
surveillance that would make a Latin American military
dictator envious. Sometimes this surveillance is merely
ludicrous—parking-enforcement officers’ wearing
miniature closed-circuit security cameras in their caps
to capture abusive responses from those ticketed, say,
or local councils’ attaching sensing devices to the
garbage cans of 3 million homes to record what people
throw away, in order to charge them for the quantity and
quality of their trash.
But often the
government’s reach is less innocuous. For example, in
the name of national security, the government under
Blair’s leadership sought to make passport applicants
provide 200 pieces of information about themselves,
including bank-account details, and undergo
interrogation for half an hour. If an applicant refused
to allow the information to circulate through other
government departments, he would not get a passport,
with no appeal. The government also cooked up a plan to
require passport holders to inform the police if they
changed their address.
A justification
presented for these Orwellian arrangements was the
revelation that a would-be terrorist, Dhiren Barot, had
managed to obtain nine British passports before his
arrest because he did not want an accumulation of stamps
from suspect countries in any of them. At the same time,
it came to light that the Passport Office issues 10,000
passports a year to fraudulent applicants—hardly
surprising, since its staff consists largely of
immigrants, legal and illegal.
As was often the case
with Blair and his government, the solution proposed was
not only completely disproportionate to the problem; it
was not even a solution. The government has admitted
that criminal gangs have already forged the U.K.’s new
high-tech passports. The only people, then, whom the
process will trouble are the people who need no
surveillance. No sensible person denies the danger of
Islamic extremism in Britain; but just as the fact that
the typical Briton finds himself recorded by security
cameras 300 times a day does not secure him in the
slightest from crime or antisocial behavior, which
remain prevalent in Britain, so no one feels any safer
from the terrorist threat despite the ever-increasing
government surveillance.
Blair similarly showed
no respect for precedent and gradual reform by
Parliament itself, which—in the absence of an
American-style written constitution—have been the
nation’s guiding principles. By decree, he made the
civil service answerable to unelected political allies,
for the first time in history; he devoted far less
attention to Parliament than did any previous prime
minister; the vast majority of legislation under his
premiership (amounting to a blizzard so great that
lawyers cannot keep up with it) passed without effective
parliamentary oversight, in effect by decree; one new
criminal offense was created every day except Sundays
for ten years, 60 percent of them by such decree,
ranging from the selling of gray squirrels and Japanese
bindweed to failure to nominate someone to turn off your
house alarm if it triggers while you are out; he
abolished the independence of the House of Lords, the
only, and very limited, restraint on the elected
government’s power; he eliminated the immemorial
jurisprudential rule against double jeopardy; he wanted
to introduce preventive detention for people whom
doctors deemed dangerous, even though they had as yet
committed no crime; he passed a Civil Contingencies Act
that permits the British government, if it believes that
an emergency anywhere in the world threatens serious
damage to human welfare or to the environment in
Britain, to confiscate or destroy property without
compensation.
That Blair should have
turned out to be so authoritarian ought to come as no
surprise to those who listened to the timbre of some of
his early pronouncements. His early emphasis on youth;
his pursuit of what he called, grandiosely, the Third
Way (as if no one had thought of it before); his desire
to create a “New Britain”; his assertion that the Labour
Party was the political arm of the British people (as if
people who did not support it were in some way not
British)—some have thought all this contained a
Mussolinian, or possibly Peronist, ring. It is
ridiculous to say that Tony Blair was a fascist; but it
would be equally absurd to see him as a defender of
liberty, at least in his own country.
Blair found the Muslim threat far easier to
tackle abroad than at home, perhaps because it required
less courage. Intentionally or not, he pandered to
domestic Muslim sentiment. During the general election,
in which the leader and deputy leader of the opposition
were Jewish, he allowed Labour to portray them as pigs
on election campaign posters. The Jewish vote in Britain
is small, and scattered throughout the country; the
Muslim vote is large, and concentrated in constituencies
upon which the whole election might turn. It is not that
Blair is anti-Semitic: no one would accuse him of that.
It is simply that, if mildly anti-Semitic connotations
served his purposes, he would use them, doubtless
persuaded that it was for the higher good of mankind.
Further, Blair’s wife,
Cherie, is a lawyer who now practices little, but who by
convenient coincidence—immediately before a general
election, and at a time of Muslim disaffection with
Labour over the Iraq War—appeared before the highest
court in the land, defending a 15-year-old girl who
claimed the right to wear full Muslim dress in school.
It turned out that an extreme British Islamic group
backed the case legally and financially.
Blair also presided over
the extension of mail voting in Muslim areas, despite
having been warned about the likely consequence: that
frequently, the male heads of households would vote for
all registered voters under their roofs. Indeed, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that Blair supported
voting by mail because of this consequence, which would
tip the vote toward the many Labour candidates who were
Muslim men themselves. Pro-Labour fraud became so
widespread that the judge leading a judicial inquiry
into an election in Birmingham concluded that it would
have disgraced a banana republic. The prime minister
also proved exceptionally feeble during the Danish
cartoon crisis, and repeatedly said things about
Islam—that it is a religion of peace, for one—that he
must have known to be untrue.
Blair, then, is no hero.
Many in Britain believe that he has been the worst prime
minister in recent British history, morally and possibly
financially corrupt, shallow and egotistical, a man who
combined the qualities of Elmer Gantry with those of
Juan Domingo Perón. America should think twice about
taking him to its heart now that he has stepped down.
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